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The Hypothetical Opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger 
from the Perspective of the Road Not Taken in 
Brown v. Board of Education. 
Kevin Brown* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Between 1938 and 1950, the Supreme Court addressed four cases 
dealing with segregation in graduate and professional schools.1  But, 
when the Court addressed these challenges to segregation it was not 
necessary to overturn the “separate but equal” doctrine announced in 
 
*  Charles A. Whistler Professor of Law and the Director of the Hudson & Holland Scholars 
Programs, Indiana University at Bloomington.. The author would like to acknowledge the 
contribution of several of his colleagues who have read earlier drafts of this commentary and to 
thank them for their very helpful comments.  These include Jeannie Bell, Hannah Buxbaum, 
Criag Bradley, Dan Conkle, Roger Dworkin, Robert Heidt, William Henderson, Ajah Mehorta, 
Christiana Ochoa, Aviva Orienstein, John Scanlan, Jeffrey Stake, and Susan Williams.  In 
addition, the author would also like to thank Silvia Biers for her excellent research help on the 
article. 
1. McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 640–41 (1950) (holding that the Plaintiff, a 
Black graduate student of education, was entitled to the same treatment as students of any other 
races and finding the State’s assignment of the Plaintiff to a seat in a classroom in a row specified 
for colored students, and assignment of Plaintiff to one particular table in the library and cafeteria, 
deprived Plaintiff of his present right to equal protection under the law); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 
U.S. 629, 635 (1950) (holding that the facilities for the study of law furnished by Texas to Black 
students was not equal to that furnished to Whites, thus depriving Black law students the right to 
equal protection under the law); Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents, 332 U.S. 631, 632–33 (1948) (per 
curiam) (holding that the State’s refusal to admit the Plaintiff, a Black female, to a state law 
school solely on the basis of race violated the Fourteenth Amendment; no separate facilities for 
legal studies were offered); Mo. ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 351–52 (1938) (finding 
that the Plaintiff, a Black law student, was denied his right to equal protection under the law 
where he was denied admission to a state law school solely on the basis of race even though the 
State offered to fund his attendance to an out-of-state law school and therefore holding that 
comparable facilities must be equal and within the state).  These four Supreme Court cases 
addressing segregation in graduate and professional schools were actually preceded by Pearson v. 
Murray, 182 A. 590 (Md. 1936).  In Pearson, the University of Maryland Law School denied 
admission to the plaintiff-applicant, an African-American graduate of Amherst College, because 
of his race.  Pearson, 182 A. at 590.  While Maryland did not provide any legal training for 
African-Americans, it quickly appropriated $10,000 to fund an out-of-state scholarship program.  
Id. at 593.  The Maryland Court of Appeals ruled that the program was insufficient to provide 
Murray with equal educational opportunities.  Id.
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Plessy v. Ferguson2 in order to grant relief to the African-American 
plaintiffs.  When the Court wrote the opinion in Brown v. Board of 
Education,3 however, it was confronted with a need to define the harm 
derived from segregation per se for the first time.  Brown presented the 
Court with a situation where it could be asserted that the physical 
facilities and other tangible factors were equal.  Given the tangible and 
measurable equality of segregation in this context, the Court was forced 
to announce the harm resulting from segregation per se.  In one of the 
most quoted phrases from Brown, the Court noted, “[t]o separate 
[African-American youth] from others of similar age and qualifications 
solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their 
status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way 
unlikely ever to be undone.”4  The Court went on to quote approvingly 
from the district court in Kansas: 
Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a 
detrimental effect upon the colored children.  The impact is greater 
when it has the sanction of law; for the policy of separating the races 
is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the Negro group.  A 
sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn.  
Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to 
[retard] the educational and mental development of Negro children 
and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a 
racial[ly] integrated school system.5 
Since the Court indicated that the harms inflicted by segregation were 
never likely to be undone, presumably Blacks who had attended 
segregated schools prior to 1954 were already damaged beyond repair.  
As a result, the Court’s opinion in Brown proclaimed that the mental 
development of Black adults may already be irretrievably stunted. 
Unquestioning admiration of Brown blinds us to the underlying 
acceptance of African-American inferiority embodied in the Court’s 
opinion striking down segregation and, thereby, justifying remedies for 
de jure segregation.6  Examining the language from emotionless 
reflection that comes from fifty years of distance, one fact is obvious: 
the Supreme Court declared from the summit of judicial reasoning as a 
proven constitutional fact that the educational and mental development 
 
2. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
    3.   Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). 
4. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494. 
5. Id.
 6. See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 205–06 (1973) (defining de jure segregation as 
a condition of segregation resulting from intentional state action directed specifically to segregate 
the school system). 
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of Black people had been retarded in ways unlikely to ever be undone.  
Regardless of whether as an empirical matter this was true in 1954 (a 
point that has been contested by later psychological research),7 it is 
important to note that the psychological harm inflicted on Blacks was 
the Court’s primary articulated justification for striking down 
segregation in public schools. 
A half century has elapsed since the Supreme Court rendered its 
historic opinion in Brown.  Therefore, we now know how the Court’s 
school desegregation jurisprudence worked in terms of physically 
desegregating America’s public schools.  The Court’s jurisprudence 
progressed from cautiously supporting school desegregation for the first 
ten years,8 to aggressively supporting it until the early 1970s,9 to 
restricting it in the 1970s and 1980s,10 to finally setting the framework 
for the termination of school desegregation decrees in the 1990s.11  
 
7. The research by the psychologist purporting to show that African-Americans in public 
schools had lower self-esteem has been strenuously criticized.  See, e.g., WILLIAM E. CROSS JR., 
SHADES OF BLACK DIVERSITY IN AFRICAN-AMERICAN IDENTITY 37, 59–83 (1991) (arguing that 
the psychologist in Brown confused racial group preference with self-esteem, assuming that racial 
group preference would automatically correspond with self-esteem).  Cross notes that direct 
measures of self-esteem developed in the 1960s led to the conclusion that Blacks did not suffer 
from low self-esteem even in 1954.  Id. 
8. See Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 232 (1964) (holding that a school board 
denied Black children equal protection when it closed certain public schools while at the same 
time contributing to the support of the private segregated schools for White children that took 
their place); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1958) (holding that good faith on the part of the 
school board would not excuse delay in implementing a desegregation plan in light of the State’s 
failures to take action to facilitate desegregation). 
9. See e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 25–31 (1971) 
(upholding the district court’s use of zoning, pairing and grouping techniques to meet flexible 
mathematical ratios between White and Black students in schools and finding that this use of 
mathematical ratios provided a starting point, rather than an inflexible requirement, and 
additionally provided a feasible remedy, even though it required busing); Green v. New Kent 
County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439–41 (1968) (holding that the school board’s “freedom of 
choice” plan failed to adequately desegregate the school system and ordering the school board “to 
come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to work 
now”). 
10. See, e.g., Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527 (1982) (upholding an amendment to the 
constitution of the State of California which limited court ordered busing for only desegregation 
purposes); Pasadena v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 440 (1976) (holding that the district court 
overstepped its authority when it required annual adjustment of attendance zones so that no 
school would have mostly minority students); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744–45 (1974) 
[hereinafter Milliken I] (holding that the imposition of a multi-district remedy for a single 
district’s segregation was improper); Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973) 
(limiting the constitutional violation of segregation to only segregation that results from 
intentional governmental conduct-de jure segregation-as opposed to the existence of segregation-
de facto segregation). 
11. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 93 (1995) (reversing an order designed to attract 
non-minority students from outside the school district to remedy intra-district violations); 
Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 489 (1992) (holding that the district court could relinquish 
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Evidence verifying these movements is amply reflected in the statistics 
regarding school integration.  Ten years after the Court’s decision in 
Brown, only 2.2% of the Black students in the eleven states that 
constituted the former Confederacy attended desegregated schools.12  In 
the 1968–69 school year 23.4% of Black students nationwide were 
attending majority White schools, but by the 1972–73 this percentage 
had increased to 36.4%.13  Also, in the 1968–69 school year 64.3% of 
Black students were in schools that were hyper-segregated, i.e. 90% or 
more minority students.  This percentage decreased to 38.7% four years 
later.14 
After opinions requiring school districts to make every effort to 
achieve the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation, the 
Supreme Court’s commitment to desegregation waned in the early 
1970s.  The percentage of Black school children attending majority 
White schools slowly increased, reaching its zenith of 37.1% in the 
1980–81 school year.  The percentage of Black students attending 
hyper-segregated schools also slowly decreased through the mid-1980s, 
reaching its nadir of 32% in 1988.15  By the 1990s, however, the Court 
had turned its attention to issues regarding the termination of school 
desegregation decrees.  Over the past seventeen years a number of 
school districts have terminated their school desegregation decrees.16  
This is one of the significant factors contributing to resegregation in 
public schools.  The percentage of African-American students in the 
South attending majority White schools decreased to 31.2% in the 
 
supervision and control over a school district before it achieved full compliance with a 
desegregation decree); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell,  498 U.S. 237, 248 (1991) (holding that 
desegregation decrees are not perpetual and should be dissolved when vestiges of prior 
discriminatory conduct have been eliminated to the extent possible). 
12. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TWENTY YEARS AFTER BROWN: EQUALITY OF 
EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 46 (1975). 
13. GARY ORFIELD & JOHN T. YUN, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT HARVARD UNIVERSITY, 
RESEGREGATION IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS 14 (June 1999), available at 
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/deseg/Resegregation_American_Schools99.pdf. 
14. Id. 
15. ERICA FRANKENBERG ET AL., THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT HARVARD UNIVERSITY, A 
MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY WITH SEGREGATED SCHOOLS: ARE WE LOSING THE DREAM? 31 
(January 2003), available at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/reseg03/ 
AreWeLosingtheDream.pdf  (examining trends in racial enrollment and segregation in American 
public schools). 
16. By the beginning of 2000, for example, about forty-five school districts had been released 
from court supervision. Sue Anne Pressley, Charlotte Schools Are Scrambling: New Ways to 
Assign Students Sought After Order to End Busing, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 1999, at A3; see 
Bradley W. Joondeph, Review Essay: A Second Redemption?, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 169, 169 
(1999) (examining the debate over the propriety of federal decisions which relinquished 
jurisdiction over formerly segregated school districts). 
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1996–97 school year and to 28.4% in 2000.17  Meanwhile, the 
percentage of African-Americans in schools that are hyper-segregated 
also increased from 32% in 1988 to 37.2% in 2000.18  Thus, one of the 
realities of the Supreme Court’s de jure segregation jurisprudence is that 
America never successfully integrated its public schools. 
Fifty years after the Court’s decision in Brown, we also know how 
the Court has resolved—at least for now—the issue of affirmative 
action in higher education.  In the Summer of 2003 the Court delivered 
what Justice Scalia called the Supreme Court’s “split double header,”19 
in the University of Michigan affirmative action decisions of Grutter v. 
Bollinger20 and Gratz v. Bollinger.21  Applying strict scrutiny, Justice 
O’Connor’s opinion for the five majority members of the Court in 
Grutter upheld the University of Michigan Law School’s admissions 
policy.22  The policy provided for the use of racial and ethnic 
classifications as part of a holistic admissions process in order to assure 
the admission of a critical mass of students from groups which have 
been historically discriminated against, like African-Americans, 
Hispanics, and Native Americans.23  But the Court rejected the 
affirmative action plan presented in Gratz, concluding that this plan 
lacked the individualized consideration necessary for a race-conscious 
admissions plan.24 
O’Connor’s opinion for the Court in Grutter noted that the 
educational benefits of enrolling a critical mass of minority students 
with a history of discrimination are substantial.25  Nevertheless, the 
 
17. FRANKENBERG, supra note 15, at 37. 
18. Id. at 31.  Hispanics actually experience higher rates of segregation than Blacks.  For 
Hispanics, segregation has been increasing since the 1968–69 school year.  Id. at 33.  At that 
time, 54.8% were in majority-minority schools and only 23.1% were in hyper-segregated schools. 
Id. at 77.  The percentage of Hispanics currently in predominately minority schools is 76.3%, and 
the percent in schools that are in hyper-segregated schools is also 37.4%.  Id. 
19. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 348 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
20. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
21. Id. 
22. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343–44. 
23. Id. at 306. 
24. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271. 
25. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 308.  The Court noted that: 
[T]he Law School’s admission policy promotes ‘cross-racial understanding,’ helps to 
break down racial stereotypes, and ‘enables [students] to better understand persons of 
different races.’  These benefits are ‘important and laudable’ because ‘classroom 
discussion is livelier, more spirited, and simply more enlightening and interesting’ 
when the students have ‘the greatest possible variety of backgrounds.’
 Id. 
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opinion implicitly accepted the commonly shared belief that in order to 
admit African-Americans, Hispanics and Native Americans in 
meaningful numbers into selective colleges, universities, and graduate 
programs, the high standards of these institutions must be compromised.  
Regarding the gaps in what he called “academic credentials,” Justice 
Thomas, in his dissenting opinion in Grutter, pointed to the fact that 
while African-Americans constitute 11.3% of those who take the LSAT 
exam, they constitute only one percent of those who score over 165.26  
Justice Thomas also noted:  
[W]hites scoring between 163 and 167 on the LSAT are routinely 
rejected by the Law School, . . . (in 2000, 209 out of 422 white 
applicants were rejected in this scoring range).  Blacks, on the other 
hand, are nearly guaranteed admission if they score above 155 (63 out 
of 77 Black applicants are accepted with LSAT scores above 155).27 
Though the Grutter opinion was about law school admissions, a 
quick look at the performance of different racial and ethnic groups on 
the SAT and ACT exams tell us that this gap in “academic credentials” 
exists in undergraduate admissions at selective colleges and universities 
as well.  For example, according to the College Board’s 2003 National 
Report profiling SAT test takers, the gap between the SAT scores of 
African-Americans and that of non-Hispanic Whites is still 206 points 
(857 and 1063, respectively).28  The disheartening aspect of such a 
realization is that this racial gap has actually increased over the past ten 
years.29  The gaps are also increasing for all Latino groups, with the 
exception of Puerto Ricans.30  There are also significant racial gaps 
 
26. Id. at 376 (Thomas J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
 27. Id. at 377 (Thomas J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
28. COLLEGE ENTRANCE EXAMINATION BOARD, 2003 COLLEGE-BOUND SENIORS: A 
PROFILE OF SAT PROGRAM TEST TAKERS 6 (June 27, 2003), available at 
http://www.collegeboard.com/prod_downloads/about/news_info/cbsenior/yr2003/pdf/2003_TOTAL
GRP_PRD.pdf.
 29. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, 
DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 2002 154 (June 2003) (reproducing a table entitled Scholastic 
Assessment Test (SAT) averages, by race/ethnicity: 1986-87 to 2001-02 as originally published in 
COLLEGE ENTRANCE EXAMINATION BOARD, NAT’L REPORT ON COLLEGE-BOUND SENIORS, 
VARIOUS YEARS (Oct. 2002)), available at http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d02/tables/ 
dt133.asp.  For the 1990–91 assessment year, the gap was only 185 points (with Whites and 
Blacks receiving total scores of 1031 and 846, respectively).  Id.  In 1996–97, the gap increased to 
195 points, where Whites scored a 1052 as compared to the 857 scored by Blacks.  Id.  In 1998–
99, the gap widened to a difference of 199 (with Whites and Blacks receiving total scores of 1055 
and 856, respectively).  Id.  In 2000–01 it increased to 201 (where the scores were 1060 and 859, 
for Whites and Blacks, respectively) and in 2001–02 the gap reached an all time high of 203 
where Blacks scored a total average of 857 and Whites scored 1060.  Id.
 30. See id. at 154 (showing that the gaps in scores with Whites have also been increasing for 
both Hispanic or Latino, and Mexican-Americans, but not Puerto Ricans).  For Hispanic-Latino, 
the gap for the 1990–91 assessment year was only 111 points (1031 (White) as opposed to 920 
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between the performance of Blacks and non-Hispanic Whites on the 
ACT.  The average composite score of African-Americans on the ACT 
is 16.9, compared to Whites at 21.7.31  This gap has held fairly 
consistent over the past seven years.32 
In this commentary I shall revisit the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Brown with hindsight provided by being fifty years removed from the 
decision.  In revisiting the Court’s opinion, my strategy is to return to 
this historical crossroad with the aim of identifying and marking out a 
road, open to the Court at that time, but not taken.  When the Court 
delivered its opinion in Brown33 another path was open to justify the 
striking down of segregation in public schools.  The amicus curiae brief 
submitted to the Court by social scientists not only pointed out the harm 
segregation inflicted upon the Black school children but also noted that 
segregation caused psychological harm to the majority group.  This 
group often develops patterns of guilty feelings, rationalizations and 
other mechanisms in an attempt to protect themselves from recognizing 
 
(Hispanic)).  Id.  In the 1996–97 assessment year the gap had increased to 118 points (1052 as 
opposed to 934); in 1998–99 it was 128 (1055–927); and in 2000–01 it was 135 (1060–925).  Id.  
For Mexican Americans, for the 1990–91 assessment year, the gap was only 118 points (1031 as 
opposed to 913).  Id.  In the 1996–97 assessment year the gap had increased to 143 points (1052 
as opposed to 909); in 1998–99 it was 146 (1055–909); and in 2000–01 it was 151 (1060–909).  
Id.  However, for Puerto Ricans the 1990–91 assessment year the gap was 156 points (1031 as 
opposed to 875).  Id.  In the 1996–97 assessment year, the gap had decreased to 151 points (1052 
as opposed to 901); in 1998–99 it was 152 (1055 compared to 903); and in 2000–01 it was 152 
(1060 compared to 908)).  Id. 
31. Press Release, ACT, Inc., ACT Scores Steady Despite Record Number of Test Takers 
(Aug. 20, 2003), available at http://www.act.org/news/releases/2003/8-20-03.html. 
32. ACT, THE 1997 ACT HIGH SCHOOL PROFILE REPORT – NATIONAL NORMATIVE DATA: 
ACADEMIC ABILITIES AND NONACADEMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF ACT TESTED 1997 
GRADUATES, at http://www.act.org/news/data/97/97data.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2004).  For 
students graduating in 1997, for example, the average ACT score for Blacks was 16.0 as 
compared to 20.0 for Whites.  Id. (Tables 5 & 6).  All racial/ethnic minorities, American Indian, 
Mexican-American, Asian-American and Other Hispanics, scored lower on the ACT exam than 
non-Hispanic, White test takers (18.0, 17.8, 20.4, and 18.1, respectively).  Id. 
33. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  I am an African-American law professor at 
Indiana University School of Law in Bloomington and graduate of Yale Law School.  Before 
joining the faculty, I worked as the only African-American for three years at a 120-person 
corporate law firm in Indianapolis.  My personal reality has been shaped by the Court’s decision 
in Brown to strike down segregation, and by the commitment to justice from people such as 
Thurgood Marshall, Robert Carter, Constance Baker Motly, Jack Greenberg, Charles Black and 
William Coleman who paved the way for the society in which I live.  Whenever I discuss the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Brown, I always do it against a personal background of tremendous 
appreciation and respect for the lawyering done by the attorneys for the Black plaintiffs and the 
decision rendered by the Supreme Court.  I stand with those who believe that segregation was a 
great evil and a blight upon the American soul.  I also recognize that the priority in the 1950s was 
to dismantle that system of oppression at whatever cost was necessary.  Thus, I do not so much 
criticize what was done in the past, as suggest the need to rededicate ourselves to the continuing 
mission of dismantling structures of racial oppression in the present and the future. 
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the essential injustice inflicted upon Blacks.34  Thus, the social 
scientists’ brief noted that segregation produced a dual harm.35  While 
on one side of the segregation coin was the harm to Blacks through the 
proclamation of a false message of inferiority, on the other side was the 
harm to Whites from the proclamation of the false message of 
superiority.  Blacks were harmed by the psychological damage that 
comes from subjection to a belief in their inferiority.  But Whites were 
harmed as well.  They were harmed when they were taught the false 
message of their superiority. 
My purpose in returning to this juncture is to suggest that if the Court 
had based its determination that segregation was unconstitutional on a 
finding that segregation harmed both Blacks and Whites, then it would 
be easy to see how our current reliance on standardized tests, as markers 
of academic ability, generates the same dual harm that segregation 
generated: proclaiming the message of the intellectual inferiority of 
underrepresented groups such as African-Americans, Hispanics and 
Native Americans, and the intellectual superiority of Whites (and now 
Asians).  These tests also provide the continued rationalizations and 
mechanisms to justify the underrepresentation at selective colleges, 
universities, and graduate programs of minority groups with a history of 
discrimination.  With the recognition of the dual harm caused by 
segregation in Brown the Court would still have upheld the University 
of Michigan Law School’s affirmative action plan in Grutter v. 
Bollinger, but the rationale for upholding it would have been very 
different. 
My vehicle for this reexamination of Brown is a hypothetical opinion 
that the Supreme Court might have rendered in Grutter if the Court had 
chosen to travel the other path open to it in Brown.  After reciting the 
facts, the procedural history, and other necessary introductory 
comments, the hypothetical Grutter opinion should turn to the crux of 
the challenge presented by Barbara Grutter and state something along 
the lines of the following: 
 
34. See Brief of Appellant at 6-7, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (No. 1,2,3,5), 
reprinted in The Effects of Segregation and the Consequences of Desegregation, a Social Science 
Statement, 34 MINN. L. REV. 413, 427 (1953) [hereinafter “Appellants’ Brief”] (analyzing 
segregation from the perspective of the dual harms it inflicts, both upon Black and White 
students). 
 35. Id. 
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II.  THE HYPOTHETICAL OPINION IN GRUTTER V. BOLLINGER 
A. 
We have now arrived at the essence of this challenge to the 
University of Michigan Law School’s affirmative action admissions 
plan.  Barbara Grutter, a White Michigan resident who applied to the 
Law School in 1996, was eventually denied admission.  She had a 3.8 
grade point average and a 161 LSAT score.  She challenges the Law 
School’s affirmative action program with violating the Equal Protection 
Clause because it provides for the admission of Blacks, Hispanics and 
Native Americans with lower academic credentials than her own.  As 
noted in the dissenting opinion written by Justice Boggs of the Sixth 
Circuit, minority applicants with an “A” average and an LSAT score as 
low as 156 (seventieth percentile nationally) are admitted at roughly the 
same rate as majority applicants with an “A” average and an LSAT 
score over 167 (the ninety-sixth percentile nationally).36 
We acknowledge, just as Justice Douglas noted almost thirty years 
ago in his dissenting opinion in DeFunis v. Odegaard,37 that the makers 
of the LSAT exam, the Law School Admissions Council, and law 
schools that utilize the exam, point to a correlation between the test 
scores and first-year grades.38  This correlation, however, may be 
 
36. Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 796 (6th Cir. 2002) (Boggs, J., dissenting).  A test 
taker’s percentile score means the percentage of all test-takers that a particular test-taker 
outscores.  Hence, someone scoring in the seventieth percentile outscored seventy percent of all 
persons taking the particular exam. 
37. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 320 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
38. There have been numerous correlation studies showing that the LSAT is usually a better 
predictor of law school performance than undergraduate Grade Point Average (“UGPA”).  See, 
e.g., LISA C. ANTHONY ET AL., LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL, PREDICTIVE VALIDITY OF 
THE LSAT: NATIONAL SUMMARY OF THE 1995–1996 CORRELATION STUDIES 14 (Technical 
Rep. No. 97-01, 1999) (reviewing data from 165 law schools and noting that the “LSAT alone 
continues to be a better predictor of law school performance than UGPA alone”); FRANKLIN R. 
EVANS, LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL, RECENT TRENDS IN LAW SCHOOL VALIDITY 
STUDIES, 4 REPORTS OF LSAC SPONSORED RESEARCH, 1978–1983, 347, 359 (1984) (reviewing 
data from 140 law schools and reporting that the “LSAT is currently a better predictor of 
performance than are undergraduate grades,” and that this trend has been observed for several 
years); LINDA F. WIGHTMAN, LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL, BEYOND FYA: ANALYSIS OF 
THE UTILITY OF LSAT SCORES AND UGPA FOR PREDICTING ACADEMIC SUCCESS IN LAW 
SCHOOL, 15 (Research Rep. No. 99-05, 2000) (collecting data from 142 law schools and finding 
that the LSAT exam alone tended to be a better predictor than UGPA alone); LINDA F. 
WIGHTMAN, LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL, PREDICTIVE VALIDITY OF THE LSAT: A 
NATIONAL SUMMARY OF THE 1990-92 CORRELATION STUDIES 9 (Research Rep. 93-05, 1993) 
(reviewing data from 167 law schools and reporting that “for each of the study years, the LSAT 
score is a substantially better predictor of first-year performance in law school than is the 
undergraduate grade point average”). 
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substantially attenuated for minority students by the third year of law 
school.39  Nevertheless, if we grant the Petitioner’s request, it is clear 
that if academic qualifications—as currently understood—are to be 
judged without regard to race or ethnicity there will be a significant 
reduction in the percentage of Blacks, Hispanics, and Native Americans 
that are admitted to selective colleges, universities, and graduate 
programs, including most law schools, of this Nation. 
Stripped to the bare-bones proposition, the Petitioner’s claim is based 
on the assumption that she is more qualified to attend the University of 
Michigan Law School than most of those minority group members who 
were admitted ahead of her.  This claim hinges primarily upon her better 
performance on the LSAT.40  Thus, the true focus of the Petitioner’s 
 
39. See, e.g., Cecilia V. Estolano, New Directions in Diversity: Charting Law Schools 
Admission Policy in a Post-Affirmative Action Era 32-33 (1997) (unpublished J.D. thesis, Boalt 
Hall School of Law, U.C. Berkeley) (finding the correlation for minority law students showed a 
sharp drop from 0.4 correlation in the first year to 0.27 in the second year, to 0.17 in the third 
year; by year three, the test scores were predicting less than three percent of the variation in 
performance).  See also William C. Kidder, Does the LSAT Mirror or Magnify Racial and Ethnic 
Differences in Education Attainment?: A Study of Equally Achieving “Elite” College Students, 89 
CAL. L. REV. 1055 (2001) (citing to a study by Linda Hamilton Krieger & Marjorie Shultz of an 
analysis done by the LSAC at the request of Boalt Hall showing that the correlation between 
LSAT-UGPA index scores and first-year grade average dropped from 0.50 to 0.26 to 0.11 during 
the three years of law school, respectively.  Specifically, for Black Boalt students, the index 
scores accounted for one quarter of the variance in first year grades, but less than one percent of 
the variance in the third year); James C. Hathaway, The Mythical Meritocracy of Law School 
Admissions, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 86, 91 tbl. 3 (1984) (showing that while the correlation between 
cumulative law school grades for Whites and minorities was about the same (0.37 and 0.38, 
respectively), this similarity masked a very real difference: the correlation for Whites was 0.35, 
0.33 and 0.28 for each of the three years, but for minorities it dropped from 0.51 to 0.27 to 0.17 
over the three years); Lani Guinier, Race Shows the Way, LEGAL TIMES, SEPT. 16, 2002, 58, 59 
(noting that the LSAT exam is only “nine percent better than random in predicting first-year law 
school grades,” and that “excessively weighting the LSAT” is the true crux of the Michigan 
affirmative action case). 
40. I see the primary problem with the affirmative action debate to be connected to different 
performance on standardized tests.  For example, Whites with equivalent undergraduate GPAs 
(“UGPAs”)are much more likely to be admitted to at least one law school than any other group: 
seventy-two percent for White applicants, sixty-nine percent for Asian Americans, sixty percent 
for Hispanics, sixty-one percent for Chicanos; sixty-two percent for Native Americans, and forty-
six percent for African-Americans.  William C. Kidder, Portia Denied: Unmasking Gender Bias 
on the LSAT and its Relationship to Racial Diversity in Legal Education, 12 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 1, 14 tbl.4.  In addition, a study done by Kidder of applicants to Boalt Hall revealed 
some startling results.  He matched African-American, Chicano/Latino, Native American and 
Asian/Pacific-American applicants with Caucasian applicants who possessed equivalent 
undergraduate grade-point averages from the same colleges during the same time period.  What 
he found was that even when controlling for these factors African-Americans scored an average 
of 9.2 points lower on the LSAT; Chicanos/Latinos scored 6.8 points lower; Native Americans 
4.0 points lower; and Asian Pacifics scored 2.5 points lower.  Kidder, supra note 39, at 1074.  
Kidder also found that when he adjusted for undergraduate major there was no significant 
difference.  Thus, all major minority groups scored lower on the LSAT than Whites even when 
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claim of merit is that performance on standardized tests, such as the 
LSAT, carry with it a racially neutral judgment about academic 
qualifications for the purpose of law school study. 
B. 
Before turning our attention to the bare-bones proposition which will 
control the disposition of the case, it is incumbent upon us to briefly 
review the sad, sordid, and prolonged history of the presumably 
objective, neutral, and non-biased justifications for racism that have 
 
holding their date of graduation, college or university attended, UGPA, and major constant.  Id. 
 National data also indicates that testing imposes a greater barrier than do other measures of 
performance.  See, e.g., William T. Dickens & Thomas J. Kane, Racial Test Score Differences as 
Evidence of Reverse Discrimination: Less than Meets the Eye, 38 INDUS. REL. J. ECON. & SOC’Y 
331, 338, 361-62 (1999) (indicating that data from the High School and Beyond survey, a 
nationally representative sample of youth, revealed a smaller Black-White gap in high school 
grades than in SAT scores).  The percentage plans adopted in California, Florida, and Texas for 
determining admissions to their selective colleges are also based on this assumption.  The plans 
point to a way to maintain minority admissions in undergraduate education, even if race 
conscious admissions programs had been struck down, by placing more emphasis on grades.  Id.  
See generally William D. Henderson, The LSAT, Law School Exams, and Meritocracy: The 
Surprising and Undertheorized Role of Test-Taking Speed, 82 TEX. L. REV. 975 (2004) (noting 
that the LSAT is a univariate test designed to measure reasoning ability).  Test-taking speed is 
assumed to be an ancillary variable with a negligible effect on candidate scores.  Id. at 991-99.  In 
reporting results from a study he conducted with data obtained from a national and a regional law 
school, Henderson separated law school grading methods into three distinct categories with 
varying degrees of time pressure: (1) in-class exams; (2) take-home exams; and (3) papers.  Id. at 
1008.   His data showed that the LSAT was a relatively robust predictor of in-class exams and a 
relatively weak predictor of take-home exams and papers.  Id. at 1010-16.  From this data 
Henderson argues that a part of the predictive ability of the LSAT for law school GPA is based 
not on reasoning ability, but on test-taking speed.  Id. at 1030-39.  Henderson also notes that 
when speed is used as a variable on law school exams, the type of testing method, rather than 
knowledge and preparation of the student, can change the ordering (i.e., relative grades) of 
individual test-takers.  Id.  The current emphasis on time-pressured law school exams, therefore, 
may skew measures of merit in ways that have little theoretical connection to the actual practice 
of law.  Id.  Finally, this study found some preliminary evidence that the performance gap 
between White and minority students may be smaller on less time-pressured testing methods, 
including blind-graded, take-home exams.  Id. 
 But see Linda F. Wightman, Standardized Testing and Equal Access: A Tutorial, in 4 
COMPELLING INTEREST EXAMINING THE EVIDENCE ON RACIAL DYNAMICS IN HIGHER 
EDUCATION 23 (Mitchell Chang et al. eds., 1999), at http://www.stanford.edu/~hakuta/racial 
_dynamics/Chapter4.pdf (prepublication draft) (last visited Sept. 20, 2004) (claiming that the data 
shows that regardless of whether the admissions process was modeled by UGPA and LSAT 
combined or by UGPA only, the consequences would be a substantial reduction in overall 
number of minority applicants admitted to ABA-approved law schools).  See also STEPHAN 
THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK AND WHITE: ONE NATION, 
INDIVISIBLE 402-03 (1997) (arguing that a wealth of evidence demonstrates that the racial gap in 
other measures of academic achievement is just as large as the SAT gap).  While it may also be 
true that there are racial gaps in GPA, the combined effect of racial gaps in both the GPAs and 
standardized tests create much higher obstacles for under represented students than one of these 
obstacles by itself would. 
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plagued Western societies since the first inadvertent contact of 
Europeans with Africans 550 years ago.  Economic motivations played 
a significant role in the selection of Blacks by the Europeans (and later 
the forefathers of our nation) as the labor force to develop and cultivate 
the New World as well as their subsequent subordination under 
segregation after the Civil War.  However, economic motivations alone 
can never suffice to explain institutions like slavery and segregation.  
People are motivated by more than material needs and desires.  
Throughout the centuries, religious, scientific, and cultural justifications 
have been propounded to justify the confinement of Blacks and other 
minorities to an inferior status.  A society that had maintained 
institutions of slavery and segregation for hundreds of years viewed 
such oppressive measures as rational responses to cope with reality as 
they perceived it.  As the inheritors of such a society, however, we have 
come to realize the awful mistake of their perception.  This Court 
authors this opinion today with the primary desire to avoid replicating 
the logic of the past on which racial oppression has been justified. 
1. 
At the time of initial contact between Europeans and Africans during 
the Fifteenth Century, the divine word of the Almighty was held 
sacrosanct in European societies.  Thus, the original justifications for 
slavery and ontological racial differences were rooted in interpretations 
of the inviolable will of God.  Long before the first African set foot on 
North American soil, biblical justifications for placing Blacks in a 
condition of servitude abounded.41  Proponents of slavery found support 
for the institution in the Old Testament.42  As long as the Europeans 
 
41. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Social Science and Segregation Before Brown, 1985 DUKE L.J. 
624, 634 (1985) (noting that “the religious anti-evolutionists . . . had produced an immense 
literature on the nature of racial characteristics, the ‘mental gap’ between blacks and whites, and 
the dangers of racial mixing”).  See also THOMAS F. GOSSETT, RACE: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA 
IN AMERICA 3–16 (1963) (detailing different religious and cultural theories on segregating the 
races, from Africa and India to the Middle East and Europe). 
42. Abraham, the Father of three faiths, owned slaves.  See Genesis 20:14 (“Then Abimelech 
brought sheep and cattle and male and female slaves and gave them to Abraham . . . .”); Exodus 
21:2 (“If thou buy an Hebrew servant, six years he shall serve: and in the seventh he shall go out 
free for nothing.”); Leviticus 25: 44–46, which states: 
Both thy bondmen, and thy bondmaids, which thou shalt have, shall be of the heathen 
that are round about you; of them shall ye buy bondmen and bondmaids.  Moreover of 
the children of the strangers that do sojourn among you, of them shall ye buy, and of 
their families that are with you, which they begat in your land: and they shall be your 
possession.  And ye shall take them as an inheritance for your children after you, to be 
your bondmen for ever: but over your brethren the children of Israel, ye shall not rule 
one over another with rigour. 
See also DANIEL P. MANNIX & MALCOM COWLEY, BLACK CARGOES: A HISTORY OF THE 
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were enslaving heathens—which they considered the Africans to be—
not only did the Almighty not prohibit it, but He positively commanded 
it.  In the New Testament, the Apostle Paul’s epistles took slavery for 
granted.43  Thus, it was often asserted that slavery could not be a sin 
against Divine law, because the Bible sanctioned it.44 
Perhaps the primary religious justification for specifically enslaving 
Blacks is derived from Chapter 9 of Genesis.45  This Chapter recounts 
an encounter that Noah had with his three sons.  It ends with Noah 
cursing the descendants of his son Ham, stating that they will be the 
servants of his other sons, Shem and Japhet.46  Before the Europeans 
began taking Blacks out of Africa, both Christians and Muslims had 
come to believe that the descendants of Ham had been turned Black.  
By the 1500s, Christian communities drew upon the Ham legend to 
explain that the enslavement of Blacks was part of a divine curse placed 
 
ATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE 1518–1865 59 (1962) (quoting Leviticus 25:44, which states “[b]oth thy 
bondmen and thy bondmaids, which thou shalt have, shall be of the heathen that are round about 
you; of them shall ye buy bondmen and bondmaids.”). 
43. See, e.g., 1 Corinthians 12:13 (“For by one Spirit are we all baptized into one body, 
whether we be Jews or Gentiles, whether we be bond or free; and have been all made to drink into 
one spirit”); Ephesians 6:5–6 (“Servants, be obedient to them that are your masters according to 
the flesh, with fear and trembling in singleness of your heart, as unto Christ; Not with eye service, 
as men pleasers; but as the servants of Christ, doing the will of God from the heart.”); Colossians 
3:22 (“Servants, obey in all things your masters according to the flesh; not with eye service as 
men pleasers; but in singleness of heart, fearing God.”); Titus 2:9–10 (“Exhort servants to be 
obedient unto their own masters, and to please them well in all things . . . not purloining, but 
shewing all good fidelity; that they may adorn the doctrine of God Our Savior in all things.”); 
Philemon 1: 13–16 (Plea for Onesimus), which states: 
Whom I would have retained with me, that in thy stead he might have ministered unto 
me in the bonds of the gospel: But without thy mind would I do nothing; that thy 
benefit should not be as it were of necessity, but willingly.  For perhaps he therefore 
departed for a season, that now as a servant, but above as a servant, a brother beloved, 
specially to me but now much more unto thee, both in the flesh, and in the Lord? 
44. Anthony E. Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The Reconstructive Theology of Dr. 
Martin Luther King, Jr., 103 HARV. L. REV. 985, 1016 (1990). 
45. GOSSETT, supra note 41, at 5. 
46. See Genesis 9: 21-27. 
And he [Noah] drank of the wine, and was drunken; and he was uncovered within his 
tent.  And Ham, the Father of Canaan, saw the nakedness of his father, and told his two 
brethren without.  And Shem and Japheth took a garment and laid it upon both their 
shoulders, and went backward, and covered the nakedness of their father; and their 
faces were backward, and they saw not their father’s nakedness.  And Noah awoke 
from his Wine, and knew what his younger son had done unto him.  And he said, 
cursed be Canaan; a servant of servants shall he be unto his brethren.  And he said, 
Blessed be the LORD God of Shem; and Canaan shall be his servant.  God shall 
enlarge Japheth, and he shall dwell in the tents of Shem; and Canaan shall be his 
servant. 
Id. 
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upon them.47  As a result, supporters of Black slavery could argue that 
enslavement of the Black race was the will of Heaven, divinely 
ordained and derived from God’s unfolding plan for humanity. 
2. 
Racial differences have always been a subject of intense academic 
study.  This is particularly true in the United States.  J. C. Nott 
summarized the general academic motivation for studying racial 
differences.48  Shortly before this Court rendered its infamous Dred 
Scott49 decision, Nott noted that the study of racial differences in this 
country is particularly important because it is the home of the three best 
defined varieties of human species—the White, the Negro and the 
Indian—to which the extensive immigration of the Chinese is rapidly 
adding a fourth.50 
This Court did not explicitly base its legal decisions upholding 
slavery in Dred Scott51 or segregation in Plessy v. Ferguson52 on the 
scientific rationale that is discussed below.  Nevertheless, this Court 
must accept its share of the responsibility for the long oppression of 
African-Americans, Native Americans, Hispanics, and other minorities.  
The scientific evidence discussed below helped to strengthen the 
perception that this Court’s decisions upholding slavery and the 
“separate but equal” doctrine were reasonable common sense opinions.  
Conversely, the Court’s opinions also added an air of legitimacy to such 
scientific endeavors. 
The first use of the word “race” did not occur until 1606, and there 
were only five theories relating to the varieties of mankind that gained 
an appreciable following during the entire seventeenth century.53  The 
first group of scientists to record racial differences, the natural 
scientists, blended religion with their scientific explanations of the 
differences of the races of humankind.  These first racial “scientists” 
were not so much seeking to develop the laws of nature independent of 
religious grounding, but were instead attempting to describe God’s 
 
47. JOE R. FEAGIN, RACIST AMERICA: ROOTS, CURRENT REALITIES, AND FUTURE 
REPARATIONS 73–74 (2000). 
48. J.C. NOTT & G.R. GLIDDON, TYPES OF MANKIND (1854). 
49. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).  The Dred Scott decision, as students of 
history and law alike know,  upheld the constitutionality of slavery.  Id. at 454. 
50. NOTT & GLIDDON, supra note 48, at 80. 
51. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 393. 
52. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
53. Leonard Lieberman et al., The Debate Over Race: Thirty Years and Two Centuries Later, 
in RACE AND IQ EXPANDED EDITION 56 (Ashley Montagu ed., 1999). 
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divine plan that could be uncovered by studying nature.54  They noted 
that nature delights in inequality.  Carolus Linnaeus, often referred to as 
the father of taxonomy,55 was the first to scientifically formalize the 
racial hierarchy.  Linnaeus divided humans into four races, Homo 
Europeaus, Homo Asiaticus, Homo Afer and Homo Americanus.  He 
linked culture and biology together in a way that has survived to this 
day.  The characteristic traits Linnaeus observed in Homo Europeaus 
were gentle, acute, inventive, and governed by custom.  He noted that 
the characteristic traits of Homo Afer were crafty, indolent, negligent, 
and governed by caprice.56  Later, German anatomist and 
anthropologist, Johann Blumenbach, also created an influential racial 
classification.  He listed Caucasians at the top of the human ladder with 
Asians, Africans, Native Americans, and Polynesians on the lower 
rungs.57 
By the end of the eighteenth century, the inferiority of Blacks, 
derived from scientific understanding of the differences in nature, was 
generally accepted.  For example, the first edition of the Encyclopedia 
Britannica in 1798 asserted in the “Negroes” entry that they were a 
people of “idleness, treachery, revenge, cruelty, impudence, stealing, 
lying, debauchery, nastiness and intemperance.”58  They were also said 
to be “strangers to every sentiment of compassion” and were “an awful 
example of the corruption of man when left to himself.”59 
Throughout much of the nineteenth century, scientists espousing the 
views of Black inferiority were embroiled in a theoretical dispute about 
the cause of such inferiority.  Scientific writing before Darwin advanced 
one of two positions: monogeny and polygeny.  The monogenists 
accepted the validity of the Genesis account of the creation of Adam 
and Eve and argued that while all humans came from one source, since 
creation the races had diverged and developed their own capacities.  
Georges Louis Leclerc de Buffon, in his 1778 book Natural History of 
 
54. Id. 
55. See Carl Linnaeus (1707–1778), available at http://www.ucmp.berkeley.edu/history/ 
linnaeus.html (July 7, 2000) (discussing the history of Carl Linnaeus, the father of taxonomy, 
who created a system of naming, ranking and classifying organisms that is, in large part, still 
utilized today). 
56. WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE 
NEGRO 1550–1812 221 (1977) (quoting from Linneaus, translated from Latin and reprinted in 
Bendyshe, HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY 424–26 (1864)). 
57. FEAGIN, supra note 47, at 81. 
58. PAUL GORDON LAUREN, POWER AND PREJUDICE: THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF 
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 21 (1988) (quoting the 1789 edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica). 
59. Id. (quoting the definition of “Negro” in the 1789 edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica). 
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Man, asserted that white was the real and natural color of man.60  Thus, 
the standard from which to judge the skin color of humans was that of 
white skin.  Given such a neutral and objective standard, there must be 
an explanation for the aberration of black skin.  While physician 
Benjamin Rush contended that the black hue of the Negro was the result 
of leprosy,61 the answer most often accepted by the monogenists was 
that black skin was an aberrant development caused by extensive 
exposure to the sun in hot climates.62 
Other scientists rejected a literal interpretation of Genesis and 
adopted the position of polygeny.  The polygenic theory had a 
significant number of followers in the United States even after 
Darwin.63  The theory asserted that the human races were derived from 
separate biological species.64  Blacks were thus another and lower form 
of life all together different from Whites.  Louis Agassiz and Samuel 
Morton were the most prominent proponents of polygeny.  Agassiz, a 
Harvard professor, founded and directed the Museum of Comparative 
Zoology.65  When asked if his theory of polygeny contradicted the 
 
60. CORNELL WEST, PROPHESY DELIVERANCE!: AN AFRO-AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY 
CHRISTIANITY 56 (1982) (citing from GEORGE LOUIS LECLERC DE BUFFON, NATURAL HISTORY 
OF MAN (1778)). 
61. See, e.g., Benjamin Rush, Observations Intended to Favor a Supposition that the Black 
Color (as it is Called) of the Negroes is Derived from Leprosy, reprinted in RACIAL THOUGHT IN 
AMERICA: FROM THE PURITANS TO ABRAHAM LINCOLN A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, VOL.1 
128-225 (Louis Ruchames ed., 1969). 
62. WEST, supra note 60, at 57. 
63. See STEPHEN J. GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 42 (1981)  
The doctrine of polygeny acted as an important agent in this transformation [of 
American science and intellectual emancipation]; for it was one of the first theories of 
largely American origin that won the attention and respect of European scientists—so 
much so that Europeans referred to polygeny as the “American school” of 
anthropology. 
Id.  For a detailed history of the American polygeny theory, see generally WILLIAM STANTON, 
THE LEOPARD’S SPOTS: SCIENTIFIC ATTITUDES TOWARD RACE IN AMERICA 1815–59 193–96 
(1960) (noting that before the Civil War, science provided a major justification for proslavery 
thinking). 
64.  GOULD, supra note 63, at 45–46 (“The theory of polygeny does not constitute an attack 
upon the scriptural doctrine of human unity.  Men are bound by a common structure and 
sympathy, even though races were created as separate species.”); STANTON, supra note 63, at 
193–96. 
65. GOULD, supra note 63, at 43.  Agassiz also noted that sub-Saharan Africa had never 
produced a regulated society.  Id. at 46–47.  Gould cited Agassiz as writing: 
[T]his compact continent of Africa exhibits a population which has been in constant 
intercourse with the white race, which has enjoyed the benefit of the example of the 
Egyptian civilization, of the Phoenician civilization, of the Roman civilization, of the 
Arab civilization . . . and nevertheless there has never been a regulated society of Black 
men developed on that continent.  Does this not indicate in this race a peculiar apathy, 
a peculiar indifference to the advantages afforded by civilized society? 
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account of creation of Adam in Genesis, Agassiz responded that the 
standard explanation for the creation of humankind rooted in the 
Genesis account of the Bible only spoke of the creation of the 
Caucasian race.66 
Samuel Morton provided the empirical work that buttressed the 
polygenic theory.67  Morton was a Philadelphia physician who had a 
reputation as a great data-gatherer, and his work even won him praise 
from our eminent Brother, Oliver Wendell Holmes.68  Morton published 
three major works on the relative sizes of human skulls between 1839 
and 1849.69  His work proved that Caucasians had the largest skulls, 
followed by Mongolians, American Indians, and then Africans.  The 
objective and neutral interpretation derived from this work was that 
intellectual superiority was tied to cerebral volume.  Since Caucasians 
were believed to have the largest skulls, a fortiori, Caucasians were also 
the most intelligent group.70 
Following naturally from the well-accepted position of the natural 
sciences regarding the inferiority of Blacks was the science of 
physiognomy—the science of discovering temperament and character 
from outward physical appearance, especially the face.  The Dutch 
anatomist, Pieter Camper, demonstrated that there exists a connection 
between facial and cranial measurements and personality traits and 
character.  Camper showed that a beautiful face and a beautiful body 
were inseparably attached to a beautiful nature, character, and soul.  For 
him the optimal facial angle was one hundred degrees.  Since the facial 
angle of Europeans measured out at ninety-seven degrees, they were 
closest to the optimal angle.  Black people, by contrast, measured 
between sixty and seventy degrees.  This placed them closer to apes and 
dogs than to (White) human beings.71 
In the mid-nineteenth century, Paul Broca, the founder of the Society 
 
Id. at 47. 
66. Id. at 45–46. 
67. See id. at 50–69 (summarizing Morton’s additions to polygeny as an empiricist and data-
analyst of races). 
68. Id. at 50–51 (referencing Morton’s vast collections of skulls for study and quoting Oliver 
Wendall Holmes as praising Morton for “the severe and cautious character of his works, which 
from their very nature are permanent data for all future students of ethnology” (internal 
quotations omitted)). 
69. Id. at 53.  Morton published the CRANIA AMERICANA in 1839, a volume on American 
Indians, the CRANIA AEGYPTIACA in 1844, a volume on skulls from Egyptian tombs, and in 
1849, a volume summarizing his entire work until that date.  Id. 
70. Id. at 54–72 (detailing Morton’s scientific findings and critiquing his analysis of his 
results). 
71. WEST, supra note 60, at 57–58. 
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of Anthropology of Paris, “broke new ground” in understanding how 
the human brain functions.  He measured the shape of the head and 
developed a cephalic index.  Broca demonstrated that variations in the 
shape of the human head were linked to significant differences in the 
races.  Black skin and wooly hair were associated with inferior 
intelligence, while White skin and straight hair were the equipment of 
the highest group.72 
Concurrent with the end of slavery, scientific explanations regarding 
the differences between the races were forced to adapt to the publication 
in 1859 of Charles Darwin’s book, Origin of the Species.  Three 
different evolutionary theories eventually swept away the old 
monogenist/polygenist discussions about the source of racial 
differences.  One group followed Charles Darwin’s statement in his 
Descent of Man, published in 1871.  Darwin wrote, “at some future 
period, not very distant as measured by centuries, the civilized races of 
man will almost certainly exterminate and replace the savage races of 
the world.”73  By the 1890s, tough-minded racial Darwinists like 
Frederick Hoffman,74 Lewis Henry Morgan,75 and Nathaniel Shaler—a 
prominent social scientist and a dean at Harvard University76—were 
asserting that the law of natural selection meant the eventual extinction 
of the Black race.  Social Darwinists who were not preaching the 
eventual extinction of the Black race were scarcely more 
complimentary.  These scientists were divided into two groups.  
Racially optimistic Social Darwinists argued that intelligence evolves 
slowly over a long period of time and that Blacks were destined to 
evolve to the level of Whites, but slowly.  As a result, it would take 
thousands of years for Blacks to make up the deficit and achieve 
intellectual equality with Whites.  The racially pessimistic Social 
Darwinists, however, argued that while Blacks were evolving, Whites 
were as well, and more importantly, at a faster rate than Blacks.  
 
72. See WILLIAM H. TUCKER, THE SCIENCE AND POLITICS OF RACIAL RESEARCH 23 (1994) 
(investigating the scientific and political vestiges of eugenics in America). 
73. CHARLES DARWIN, DESCENT OF MAN 201 (1871). 
74. Hoffman pointed to census statistics showing higher Black mortality and lower Black birth 
rates than those of Whites.  He went on to argue that emancipation from slavery had been the 
worst thing that ever happened to Blacks, because as enslaved people, at least their needs were 
met. Hovenkamp, supra note 41, at 654.  The law of natural selection meant the eventual 
extinction of Blacks. TUCKER, supra note 72, at 35. 
75. See LEWIS HENRY MORGAN 1818–1881, available at http://www.mnsu.edu/emuseum/ 
information/biography/klmno/morgan_lewis_henry.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2004) (discussing 
that Morgan’s work was the “foundation for the new world view of genetic explanation, cultural 
evolution or social Darwinism”).  Morgan also confirmed this notion by arguing that the Black 
race was in a lower stage of development than Whites.  Hovenkamp, supra note 41, at 653–54. 
76. See TUCKER, supra note 72, at 35. 
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Therefore, the gap between the two races was actually growing larger, 
not smaller.77 
3. 
As the twentieth century dawned, scientists provided a new form of 
evidence for proving the substandard nature of the Black race—
intelligence testing.  In 1904, the French minister of public education 
commissioned Alfred Binet to develop techniques to identify children 
whose lack of success in normal classrooms suggested a need for some 
form of special education.  Binet developed a series of short tasks, 
related to everyday problems that were intended to assess basic 
reasoning processes such as ordering, comprehension, invention and 
censure.78  Binet, however, did not assert that he was measuring an 
innate, genetically inherited capacity. 
The theory that Intelligence Quotent (“IQ”) is a product of heredity 
was an American theory.79  H. H. Goddard brought Binet’s ranking 
scale of intelligence to America and refined it into a score about innate 
intelligence.  In 1916, Lewis Terman, a professor at Stanford 
University, revised Binet’s scale and increased the number of tasks to 
be performed on the IQ test.  He named his revised scale the Stanford-
Binet.80  Terman relentlessly emphasized that the IQ tests measured the 
limits of intelligence and the inevitability of such limits.81  According to 
Terman, environment is much less important than is the original 
endowment in determining the nature of the traits in question.82 
 
77. But see Hovenkamp, supra note 41, at 634 (citing beliefs of Edward Taylor and Lewis 
Henry Morgan that intelligence “evolves” and that someday, the Afro-American would develop 
an intelligence equal to that of Caucasians). 
78. GOULD, supra note 63, at 149. 
79. Id. at 155–57. 
80. LEWIS M. TERMAN, THE MEASUREMENT OF INTELLIGENCE: AN EXPLANATION OF AND A 
COMPLETE GUIDE FOR THE USE OF THE STANFORD REVISION AND EXTENSION OF THE BINET-
SIMON INTELLIGENCE SCALE 40–56 (1916).  The Binet-Simon test utilized age standards and 
mental functions to test general intelligence and to allow categorization of students into age 
categories.  Id. at 40–43.  This allowed categorization within defined psychological parameters.  
Id.  The Stanford-Binet test, after acknowledging limitations of the Binet-Simon test, added 
thirty-six new tests (or tasks).  Id. at 48–50, 56.  These new tests added more tasks for children to 
complete and allowed a more thorough test of their intelligence.  See id. at 56–61 (detailing the 
Stanford revisions and extensions to the Binet test by years and tasks). 
81. See id. at 1–21 (providing an overview of categories of children and their resulting 
behavior, for example, that those who tested as “feeble-minded” inevitably became delinquents).  
See also id. at 65–104 (analyzing many other intelligence quotient tests and the different results 
per child as they relate to success later in life). 
82. Id. at 118.  Terman asserted that: 
[T]he fact that an exceptionally superior endowment is discoverable by the tests, 
however unfavorable the home from which it comes, and that inferior endowment 
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R. M. Yerkes, a Harvard University professor, convinced the U.S. 
Army to allow him to administer intelligence tests to all of its World 
War I recruits.  Yerkes argued that he could assist in the war effort by 
efficiently identifying those people who should be leaders and those 
who should be commanded.  Yerkes, Terman, and Goddard, among 
other colleagues, developed the Army’s mental tests in the summer of 
1917.  As an Army colonel, Yerkes presided over the administration of 
these tests to 1.75 million World War I recruits.  One of Yerkes’ 
lieutenants, E.G. Boring, selected 160,000 case files and produced 
results from this sample.  His results confirmed that Blacks were a 
mentally deficient race.  He found that Blacks were at the bottom of the 
intellectual scale, with a full eighty-nine percent testing at the level of 
moron or below.83 
The source of the differences noted in intelligence testing sparked a 
scientific debate.  While both sides accepted the reality that Blacks were 
intellectually inferior, a disagreement developed about the cause of the 
differences.  Yerkes and Terman, among others, asserted that their 
measures of intelligence were markers of permanent, inborn limits.  
Thus, the mental infirmities that these tests revealed were generally not 
remediable by social intervention.  Environmentalists rejected this 
biological determinism.  They harkened back to Alfred Binet’s original 
motivation by emphasizing the power of creative education to increase 
the achievements of all children, but especially those from deficient 
social environments.  Mental testing, for environmentalists, was a way 
of enhancing the potential of those who tested poorly through proper 
education and improving their physical and social environment.  While 
the environmentalist accepted the intellectual inferiority of those who 
performed poorly on the intelligence tests, the environmentalist believed 
that social policy could be structured to remedy this deficiency. 
C. 
It was at the point where the environmentalists and the biological 
determinists were debating the issue of nature or nurture that this Court 
stepped into the debate with our opinion in Brown v. Board of 
Education.  We delivered an opinion that transcended the debate 
between the environmentalists and the biological determinists.  This 
Court recognized that both of these groups agreed upon the 
 
cannot be normalized by all the advantages of the most cultured home. . . .  The tests 
actually reach and discover the general developmental conditions of intelligence, and 
not mere fragments of knowledge and attainments acquired by chance.  
Id. 
83. GOULD, supra note 63, at 197–98. 
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fundamental—albeit false—premise that there was only something 
deficient about the Black race; they differed, however, as to its cause—
biology or socio-cultural environment.  In our opinion in Brown, this 
Court recognized that segregation created a dual psychological harm 
that effected Blacks and Whites in different ways.  Segregation affected 
Blacks by disseminating a false message about the inferiority of 
African-Americans and it affected Whites by disseminating a false 
message about the superiority of Caucasians.  As a result, this Court 
noted the dual nature of the psychological harm caused by segregation.  
As a result, we viewed remedies for segregation as beneficial to all 
school children, but in different ways. 
In this Court’s 1968 decision in Green v. New Kent County School 
Board,84 we addressed a “freedom of choice” school assignment plan 
used to remedy the operation of a dual school system.  The plan, 
however, did not produce a significant amount of racial balancing in the 
schools.  The New Kent County School Board argued that its freedom 
of choice plan could only be faulted by finding that the Fourteenth 
Amendment required compulsory integration.  We rejected this 
argument, however, emphasizing that school boards operating state-
compelled dual systems were charged with the affirmative duty to take 
whatever steps might be necessary to eliminate racial discrimination 
root and branch.  We went on to note that: 
[S]chools are an important socializing institution, imparting those 
shared values through which social order and stability are maintained.  
Schools bear central responsibility for inculcating the fundamental 
values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system.  
When children attend racially and ethnically isolated schools, these 
shared values are jeopardized: If children of different races and 
economic and social groups have no opportunity to know each other 
and to live together in school, they cannot be expected to gain the 
understanding and mutual respect necessary for the cohesion of our 
society.  The elimination of racial isolation in the schools promotes 
the attainment of equal educational opportunity and is beneficial to all 
students both black and white.85 
 
84. Green v. New Kent County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
 85. This statement actually comes from the opinion of the Supreme Court of Connecticut in 
Sheff v. O’Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1285 (Conn. 1996) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted).  I am using the statements in my hypothetical opinion as what would have been 
representative of the United States Supreme Court decision in Green had Brown been decided as I 
am opining within this comment.  In Sheff, the Supreme Court of Connecticut addressed a 
situation where the segregation in Hartford public schools could not be traced to intentional state 
conduct.  The court concluded that under the Constitution of the State of Connecticut there is an 
“affirmative responsibility to remedy segregation in our public schools, regardless of whether that 
segregation has occurred de jure or de facto.”  Id. at 1283.  Thus, it was the racial and ethnic 
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One of our brethren noted in a separate concurring opinion that: 
[I]f the mission of education is to prepare our children to survive and 
succeed in today’s world, then they must be taught how to live 
together as one people.  Anything less will surely result in a 
segregated society with one racial and ethnic community pitted against 
another.  Instead of fostering social division, we must build an 
integrated society, commencing with educating our children in a non-
segregated environment.86 
Thus, the duty to take account of race for the purposes of producing 
an integrated school was born.  As made clear by our opinions, school 
desegregation was not a social welfare program for Blacks (and later 
other minorities),87 but a benefit for all public school students. 
In Keyes v. School District No. 1,88 this Court first faced a situation 
where the segregation of public schools was not the result of intentional 
governmental conduct.  We stated that a distinction needed to be drawn 
between de facto segregation and de jure segregation.  De jure 
segregation was the result of governmental conduct and, thus, violated 
the equal protection clause.  This Court concluded that the existence of 
de facto segregation provided a strong evidentiary presumption that the 
segregation in public schools was the result of governmental conduct.  It 
was possible for a given school district to rebut the presumption that 
segregation was not a function of governmental conduct.  But our 
opinion set a very high evidentiary requirement in order to rebut the 
presumption that few school districts were able to meet.  In explaining 
why the evidentiary requirement was subsequently set so high, we noted 
that the ultimate goal of remedies for de jure segregation was to 
eradicate the vestiges of the dual harm of segregation.  As a result, 
racially and ethnically mixed schools primarily served to benefit all 
public school students and American society. 
In the 1974 Milliken v. Bradley opinion, this Court upheld a lower 
court decision including suburban schools in the desegregation remedy 
for Detroit public schools.89  We noted in that opinion that school 
 
composition of the public schools that triggered the affirmative obligation to remedy the 
condition.  Id. at 1281, 1288. 
86. Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1294 (Berdon, J., concurring).  See supra note 85 (indicating that the 
statement is used for the hypothetical outcome of Green, had Brown not been decided the way it 
was in 1954). 
87. See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. Number 1, 413 U.S. 189, 197–98 (noting that, in the Southwest, 
Hispanics and African-Americans have a great many things in common, including “economic and 
cultural deprivation and discrimination”),  reh’g denied, 414 U.S. 883 (1973).
 88. Id.
 89. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 752–53 (1974).  I am proposing the outcome of 
Milliken on the basis of a different outcome of Brown.  In Milliken, the Court reversed and 
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districts were creations of the state.  Given the fact that the State of 
Michigan was also found responsible for de jure segregation in Detroit’s 
public schools, the remedy did not have to be confined to the borders of 
the Detroit public school district.  While this Court recognized the need 
to place a limit on the desegregation remedies, we noted that the limit 
was dictated by practical considerations.  In addressing the issue of the 
transportation of students in pursuit of an inter-district desegregation 
remedy, this Court stated: 
An objection to transportation of students may have validity when the 
time or distance of travel is so great as to either risk the health of the 
children or significantly impinge on the educational process. . . .  It 
hardly needs stating that the limits on time of travel will vary with 
many factors, but probably with none more than the age of the 
students.90 
D. 
The Court renders this opinion today against the background of the 
history of the presumably objective, neutral, and non-biased 
justifications for supporting the oppression of minorities—particularly 
African-Americans—and this Court’s history of school desegregation 
jurisprudence that seeks to combat the dual harm of segregation.  The 
propriety of using the LSAT as the basis of the Petitioner’s racially-
neutral assertion that she was more qualified to attend the University of 
Michigan Law School than certain minority students from racial or 
ethnic groups whose average group scores are lower than non-Hispanic 
Whites can now be placed in its proper historical context. 
Barbara Grutter attempts to appeal to a sense of “simple justice” in 
our society.  The problem with this claim of simple justice is that it can 
only logically be based on the assumption that race and ethnicity are 
irrelevant considerations in determining a person’s life experiences.  For 
Grutter’s race-neutral assumption about merit based on standardized 
tests to be valid, it would be necessary for race to have no more 
relevance in our society than eye color would in a society where all had 
access to colored contact lenses.  However, this assumption must be 
weighed against the reality of every day life in America today.  While it 
is the sincere and deepest desire of every member of this Court to see 
 
remanded, only allowing the desegregation remedy to be applied to Detroit public schools and not 
across the state of Michigan.  Id. 
90. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg, 402 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1971).  In this opinion, the Court 
addressed a number of practical considerations involving intra-district school desegregation 
remedies.  Id.  I feel that this would be the position adopted by the Court deciding Milliken if my 
hypothetical scenario were true. 
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America as a society where race and ethnicity do not matter, that day 
has not yet dawned.  This Court also recognizes that many African-
Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans have been tremendously 
successful in American society.  However, who can seriously take heed 
of the continued disparity in group oriented social statistics like per 
capita income,91 poverty rates,92 infant mortality,93 life expectancy,94 
and college attendance and graduation rates,95 and not come to the 
 
91. When adjusted for inflation, the per capita income of African-Americans, for example, 
increased by 250 percent from 1967 to 2000.  Yet, this increase left Blacks earning only sixty five 
percent of that of non-Hispanic White per capita income in 2000.  See U.S. BUREAU OF THE 
CENSUS, HISTORICAL INCOME TABLE P–1B, available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/income/ 
histinc/p01b.html (last modified Sept. 30, 2002) (charting per capita income for Blacks in the 
U.S. from 1967 through 2001); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HISTORICAL INCOMES TABLE P–1A, 
available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/income/histinc/p01a.html (last modified Sept. 30, 2002) 
(charting per capita income for non-Hispanic Whites in the U.S. from 1967 through 2001). 
92. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, in 1966, 41.8% of the Black population, 50.6% of 
Black children under the age of eighteen, and 55.1% of Blacks over the age of sixty five lived 
below the poverty line.  In 2001, these percentages decreased to 22.7%, 30.2% and 21.9%, 
respectively for African-Americans with corresponding figures for non-Hispanic White 
Americans of 7.8%, 9.5%, and 8.1%.  For general poverty statistics in 1966 and 2001, see U.S. 
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL POVERTY TABLES, TABLE 2: POVERTY STATUS OF 
PEOPLE BY FAMILY RELATIONSHIP, RACE, AND HISPANIC ORIGIN: 1959 TO 2002, available at 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/poverty/histpov/hstpov2.html (last modified Oct. 6, 2003) (charting 
the numbers of adult U.S. residents, by race, that fell below the poverty level annually).  For those 
under the age of eighteen and over the age of sixty five in both 1966 and 2001 see also U.S. 
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL POVERTY TABLES: 2002, TABLE 3: POVERTY STATUS OF 
PEOPLE, BY AGE, RACE, AND HISPANIC ORIGIN: 1959 TO 2002, available at 
http://www.census.gov/ hhes/poverty/histpov/hstpov3.html (last modified Oct. 6, 2003) (charting 
the numbers of U.S. children under the age of eighteen, by race, that fell below the poverty level 
annually). 
93. The infant mortality rate for children of Black mothers has fallen by over fifty percent 
from 22.2 per 1,000 live births to 14.6 between 1980 and 1999.  But this figure is still far higher 
than the children of non-Hispanic White mothers mortality rate which fell from 10.9 to 5.8 over 
the same period.  See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, TABLE 23: INFANT 
MORTALITY RATES, FETAL MORTALITY RATES, AND PERINATAL MORTALITY RATES, 
ACCORDING TO RACE: UNITED STATES, SELECTED YEARS 1950–1999, available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/tables/2001/01hus023.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2004) (charting 
infant, fetal and perinatal mortality rates, by race, in the U.S. from 1950 through 1999). 
94. The life expectancy of Black males increased by over eight years from 1970 to 2000 and 
that of Black females by nearly seven years.  Yet, the figures from 2000 still have Black males 
living six and one-half years less than non-Hispanic White males (68.3 and 74.8) and Black 
females living five years less than non-Hispanic White females (75.0 and 80.0).  See CENTERS 
FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 49 NATIONAL VITAL STATISTICS REPORT 24 (Oct. 9, 
2001), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr49/nvsr49_12.pdf (reporting on the 
life expectancy for U.S. citizens by age, race and sex for the year 2000). 
95. The percentage of Blacks ages eighteen to twenty four enrolled in higher education 
increased from 13% in 1967 to 31.3% in 2001.  However, the percentage of non-Hispanic Whites 
enrolled in college increased over the same period from 26.9% to 39.3%.  See NCES DIGEST 
2002, supra note 29, at tbl. 186 (charting the annual enrollment rates of 18 through 24 year olds 
in the U.S., by race, from 1967 through 2001).  The college completion rate for Blacks over the 
age of twenty five increased from 4.5% in 1970 to 16.5% in 2000.  But the non-Hispanic White 
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obvious conclusion that race and ethnicity still matter today, and matter 
in particularly negative ways for disadvantaged minorities in America?  
The tremendous achievement of successful members of these minority 
groups should not blind our society to the reality of the continued 
existence of the effects of discrimination upon these groups.  As a 
consequence, to achieve the same result on standardized tests requires 
minorities to overcome an additional barrier which people like Barbara 
Grutter never faced. 
It has become common fare for Whites denied admission to selective 
colleges, universities, or graduate programs to assert that if they had 
been Black, their test scores would have been sufficient for admission to 
the program of their choice.  But this fallacious reasoning fails to 
recognize the undeniable impact of race and racism that is still an aspect 
of everyday American life.  If this White person had been born Black, 
or for that matter Latino or Native American, her entire life would have 
been different.  Part of that difference would no doubt translate into 
lower scores on standardized tests like the LSAT, the SAT, or the ACT.  
Simply put, because of the existence of the history of racial and ethnic 
oppression in our country, right now it may not be possible to develop a 
culturally-neutral standardized test in which the score of a non-Hispanic 
White can be equated with that of a Black, Latino, or Native American. 
This Court does not want to overstate the racial gap between Whites 
and Blacks (or other underrepresented minority groups) that exists on 
standardized tests or their perception of reality due to the difference in 
cultural experience of the two groups.  Standardized tests are used to 
measure the differences between the people who take them.  If ninety-
nine percent of the knowledge and understanding among people is the 
same, then this ninety-nine percent would be excluded for purposes of 
standardized tests because it would tell us nothing about how those who 
take the test differ from one another.  Only the differences among 
individuals matter for purposes of assessing their abilities through the 
use of standardized tests.  Thus, if the typical African-American 
experience, as well as that of other minorities in this society, is only 
slightly dissimilar from that of non-Hispanic Whites, such a slight 
dissimilarity will translate into huge divergences at the upper end of the 
 
completion rate increased from 11.6% to 28.1%.  For 1970 figures, see BLACK AMERICANS: A 
STATISTICAL SOURCEBOOK 128 (Louise L. Hornor ed. 2000) (charting the annual college 
completion rate for persons twenty-five years old and older in the U.S. from 1970 through 1998).  
For the 2000 figures, see The U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY tbl. 
7 (Feb. 22, 2001), available at http://www.census.gov/population/ socdemo/race/Black/ppl-
142/tab07.txt (charting the number and percent of U.S. population aged twenty five and older by 
race, sex, and education level in March 2000). 
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test score range of standardized tests, drafted only to measure the 
differences among people. 
Among the primary justifications for the Law School’s admission 
policy are that it promotes cross-racial understanding, helps to break 
down racial stereotypes, and enables students to better understand 
persons of different races.96 These benefits are important and laudable 
because classroom discussion is livelier, more spirited, and simply more 
enlightening and interesting when the students have the greatest 
possible range of diverse backgrounds.97  This Court believes that these 
justifications tacitly recognize that being a member of an 
underrepresented minority group with a history of discrimination may 
create very different experiences from those of members of majority 
racial groups.  This Court also recognizes the obvious truth of this 
statement, but we extend it to its logical conclusion with regard to the 
challenge raised by Grutter.  The reason the Law School recognizes that 
students from underrepresented groups with a history of discrimination 
are likely to bring a different perspective to the Law School is also the 
very reason they are likely to not do as well on culturally biased 
standardized examinations. 
Barbara Grutter’s claim relies on 500 years of invalid religious, 
scientific, and cultural evidence that has inexorably led to the dual harm 
that this Court firmly rejected almost fifty years ago in its opinion in 
Brown.  Her claim is the latest manifestation of the presumably 
objective, neutral, and non-biased justifications for racial differences 
propounded first by Biblical scholars, then by natural scientists, 
followed by polygenicists and monogenists, physiognomists, Social 
Darwinists, proponents of IQ tests, and finally, by those articulating 
theories of deficit socio-cultural environments of disadvantaged 
minorities.  If this Court were to accept the Petitioner’s argument that 
she is more qualified because she was able to perform better on 
culturally-biased standardized tests, we would be committing the same 
sophistry that has plagued our nation since its very beginning.  This 
Court would be replicating the dual harms of segregation recognized in 
our far-sighted opinion in Brown by accepting as valid judgments that 
lead to the dissemination of the dual messages that Blacks and other 
minorities are intellectually inferior, and non-Hispanic Whites are 
intellectually superior. 
If we are to achieve the true individuality that we seek, the Gordian 
 
96. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003) (quoting Appellant’s Petition for Certiorari 
at 244a, 246a.). 
97. Id. 
BROWN3.0 9/22/05  12:38 PM 
1999] The Hypothetical Opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger 127 
Knot of justifications for continued racial oppression, forged so long 
ago, must be severed.  Let the next major cut in that knot be declared by 
this Court here and now.  This Court will not allow the myth of 
intellectual inferiority of Blacks and other disadvantaged minorities, and 
the concomitant myth of intellectual superiority of non-Hispanic 
Whites, to take on a new existence through the application of culturally-
biased standardized tests.  This Court announces its firm resolve to root 
these beliefs out of the American culture. 
We reject the challenge made by Barbara Grutter to the Law School’s 
affirmative action policy.  However, we are still troubled by the 
implications that are left by the Law School’s justification for 
consideration of race and ethnicity because it fails to remove the 
implication that these underrepresented minority students are not as 
qualified to attend the Law School as majority students with higher 
LSAT scores.  Therefore, we remand this case back to the lower court 
and direct the Law School to develop policies and practices that assure 
the admittance of a critical mass of underrepresented minorities to its 
program that are not based upon culturally-biased standards that favor 
the dominant non-Hispanic White group.  In so doing, these new 
policies and procedures must remove any stain, stigma, notion, or 
suggestion that the underrepresented minorities admitted are in any way 
less qualified or less deserving of admittance in a meritocratic 
procedure than applicants from other racial ethnic groups. 
We suggest, but do not require, that one way in which to accomplish 
this command is to quantify the amount of cultural bias and adjust 
upwards the test scores of underrepresented groups with a history of 
discrimination.  For example, the Law School could seek to quantify the 
portion of the gap between the LSAT scores of African-Americans and 
non-Hispanic Whites that is attributable to race as opposed to other non-
racial factors such as socio-economic status, region of the country, or 
strength of undergraduate admissions program.  The portion of the gap 
between the performance of Blacks and Whites that cannot be traced to 
non-racial factors should be presumed to be the result of cultural bias 
attributable to the LSAT.  Once the racial effect is quantified, then the 
Law School could adjust upwards the LSAT score of all African-
Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans to account for this 
quantified cultural bias. 
We recognize that full implementation of this requirement may 
require the Law School to develop solutions of varied kinds.  Thus, we 
hereby direct the lower courts to take such proceedings and enter such 
orders and decrees consistent with this opinion.  Such proceedings must 
be achieved with all deliberate speed as is necessary to assure the 
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admittance of a critical mass of underrepresented minorities in a 
culturally-neutral admissions process that does not convey the implicit 
message that underrepresented minorities are not as qualified as their 
counterparts from other racial and ethnic groups. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
